Odysseus Stone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Odysseus Stone has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jelle Bruineberg
Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Communication, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Perceptual attention and indeterminacy: Merleau-Pontyian challenges to naïve realism and representationalism
In Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau-Ponty criticizes what he calls “Empiricist” and “Intellectualist” accounts of perception. One of his central criticisms is that both misconstrue the relationship between perception and attention. As a result, neither can tell a coherent story about the role of attention in perceptual knowledge. In this paper, we extract the core lessons of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion and apply them to some prominent contemporary accounts of the relation between attention and perception, namely Sebastian Watzl’s (2017) and Bill Brewer’s (2013). Although operating within very different frameworks—Watzl is a representationalist, whereas Brewer is a naïve realist—we show that they encounter a similar set of problems, which are highlighted in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. We end by providing a set of constraints that any adequate account of the relation between attention and perception must meet, and sketch how the naïve realist and representationalist, each in their own way, might satisfy these constraints.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Open AccessPerceptual attention and indeterminacy: Merleau-Pontyian challenges to naïve realism and representationalism
In Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau-Ponty criticizes what he calls “Empiricist” and “Intellectualist” accounts of perception. One of his central criticisms is that both misconstrue the relationship between perception and attention. As a result, neither can tell a coherent story about the role of attention in perceptual knowledge. In this paper, we extract the core lessons of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion and apply them to some prominent contemporary accounts of the relation between attention and perception, namely Sebastian Watzl’s (2017) and Bill Brewer’s (2013). Although operating within very different frameworks—Watzl is a representationalist, whereas Brewer is a naïve realist—we show that they encounter a similar set of problems, which are highlighted in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. We end by providing a set of constraints that any adequate account of the relation between attention and perception must meet, and sketch how the naïve realist and representationalist, each in their own way, might satisfy these constraints.
- Open Access
- 5 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (2-3) , 461-484
Structuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency
Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention.
- 5 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (2-3) , 461-484
Open AccessStructuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency
Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention.