XTXiao Tan

Xiao Tan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Xiao Tan has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    From Sanctions to Self-Reliance: Export Controls, Retaliation, and Innovation Outcomes

    by Yifan Cao, Bin Shen, Xiao Tan, Xiaole Wu

    China tensions over advanced technologies, we study a setting in which the sanctioning government sets an export control threshold so that only components with performance below this threshold are eligible for export, and the sanctioned manufacturer must choose between accepting degraded components and developing homegrown alternatives with uncertain outcomes. We show that the optimal control threshold exhibits a nonmonotonic relationship with R&D cost and innovation capability. While an economy-oriented government naturally favors free trade, even a technology-oriented government does not always choose full decoupling. For intermediate R&D costs, restricted export is optimal to suppress innovation and control the performance gap at a fixed level. In general, as the sanctioned manufacturer's innovation capability increases, the optimal policy follows a tighten-ease-tighten pattern. When innovation capability is limited, tighter export controls can reduce the profits of all supply chain players. We further incorporate retaliatory export controls on upstream raw materials imposed by the sanctioned side. Retaliation generates a dual policy adjustment: it leads the sanctioning government to relax the optimal threshold within the restricted export regime, but makes full decoupling optimal over a wider range of policy weight on the technological gap. Retaliation can benefit both the sanctioned manufacturer and the supplier in the sanctioning country when the weight on the technological objective is intermediate. Taken together, our results highlight how endogenous export control policy design, self-reliance incentives, and retaliatory actions jointly shape the outcomes of global technology rivalry.

  • Flexibility Value of Reshoring Capacity Under Policy Uncertainty and Domestic Competition

    by Panos Kouvelis, Xiao Tan, Sammi Y. Tang

    Problem definition: Companies operating global supply chains face growing policy uncertainties that affect the costs of importing raw materials (RM) and finished goods (FG) from low-cost to developed countries, as well as the relative profitability of production in different countries. This has prompted the need for diversified global supply chains often involving the addition of onshore production alongside existing offshore facilities. Motivated by recent developments in the U.S. clean energy sector, this paper adopts a game-theoretic model to analyze a global firm’s reshoring capacity decision and output quantity competition with a domestic manufacturer under policy uncertainty. We examine the effects of these policies on operational decisions and profitability for both firms. Methodology/results: We show that the impact of FG tariffs depends on two opposite effects: an output quantity effect that leads to reduction of reshoring investment as the expected unit cost in serving the market increases and an overflow demand effect that encourages more reshoring investment to minimize the overflow of unsatisfied production to offshore locations. RM tariffs do not affect overflow production, and the output quantity effect will always dampen reshoring investment. Because consumer tax credits directly influence market demand, when firms’ output decisions are made after demand and therefore policy realization, the output quantity effect is absent. The overflow demand effect and stimulated higher demand will incentivize higher reshoring investment. Furthermore, we show that higher tariffs hurt the global firm’s profit as tariffs increase its average output cost, whereas tax credits can benefit the firm. Although both policies are intended to protect domestic firms, they may negatively affect their profit when the global firm’s reshoring capacity is high, intensifying competition between them. Finally, the existence of domestic competition will reduce reshoring investment when domestic manufacturing is efficient. However, when global firms have significant cost advantage, the presence of domestic competition may encourage aggressive reshoring investment. Managerial implications: For global firms, investing in reshoring capacity creates a “real option” in production allocation in serving the market, and the provided operational flexibility enhances competitiveness in an uncertain environment. For policymakers, it is crucial to carefully consider the tariff level, which stage of a supply chain to execute trade restrictions on, and tax credit amounts to be used. Very high tariffs on moderate size markets may have unexpected effect on reshoring. Trade and industrial policies should be carefully analyzed for their effectiveness, accounting for cost disadvantages of domestic competitors and market demand strength. Funding: X. Tan was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant JKN02242202]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0387 .