Martin Wiernsperger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Martin Wiernsperger has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ben Greiner
Vienna Univ Econ & Business Adm, Inst Markets & Strategy, Welthandelspl 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Ben W. Van Landuyt
University of Arizona
1 shared publication - Brian J. White
S C Johnson College of Business, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853
1 shared publication Christoph Feichter
1 shared publication- Eric W. Chan
The University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication Georg Lintner
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 1020 Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
When Is It Fairer to Allocate Resources for Training to Lower Performing Versus Higher Performing Employees?
Professional development and training are essential for organizational growth and success, but resource constraints often force managers into a dilemma: Should they train their lower performing or higher performing employees? While lower performers with greater skill gaps can benefit more from training than higher performers, managers must also consider employees’ fairness concerns. Using an interactive experiment, we predict and find that how employees react to their manager's allocation of training resources depends on the prevailing fairness norms in the work environment. When egalitarian norms dominate, such as when employees have little control over their job tasks, lower performers take the receipt of resources for training for granted and react negatively when the manager allocates those resources to higher performers instead. In contrast, when meritocratic norms dominate, such as when employees have more control over their job tasks, higher performers react more negatively than lower performers to not receiving training resources. Additional experiments suggest that these fairness‐norm–dependent reactions are most pronounced under tournament incentives and may disappear under individual performance‐based pay. Overall, our study highlights the importance for managers to consider both employee productivity and the prevailing fairness norms of the work environment when allocating scarce training resources.
- 20 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
When Is It Fairer to Allocate Resources for Training to Lower Performing Versus Higher Performing Employees?
Professional development and training are essential for organizational growth and success, but resource constraints often force managers into a dilemma: Should they train their lower performing or higher performing employees? While lower performers with greater skill gaps can benefit more from training than higher performers, managers must also consider employees’ fairness concerns. Using an interactive experiment, we predict and find that how employees react to their manager's allocation of training resources depends on the prevailing fairness norms in the work environment. When egalitarian norms dominate, such as when employees have little control over their job tasks, lower performers take the receipt of resources for training for granted and react negatively when the manager allocates those resources to higher performers instead. In contrast, when meritocratic norms dominate, such as when employees have more control over their job tasks, higher performers react more negatively than lower performers to not receiving training resources. Additional experiments suggest that these fairness‐norm–dependent reactions are most pronounced under tournament incentives and may disappear under individual performance‐based pay. Overall, our study highlights the importance for managers to consider both employee productivity and the prevailing fairness norms of the work environment when allocating scarce training resources.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effect of R&D Capitalization on Managerial Effort and Investor Expectations
We examine whether the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) costs affects how much effort managers devote to R&D and investors' expectations of that effort. In an incentivized laboratory market, we hold R&D costs fixed, while managers choose how to divide their unobservable effort between a routine operating project that generates certain, immediate returns and an uncertain R&D project for which additional effort increases the probability of success. We manipulate whether R&D costs are expensed or capitalized, with capitalized R&D subject to impairment testing, and whether managers are compensated based on investor-assessed market value or realized intrinsic value. We find that capitalization increases managers' R&D effort, but only when their compensation is based on investor-assessed market value, consistent with managers strategically responding to the reporting consequences of their effort choices. Investors, however, expect less managerial R&D effort under capitalization than expensing. This divergence creates systematic estimation errors, with investors overestimating R&D effort under expensing and underestimating it under capitalization. Overall, our findings show that R&D accounting interacts with managerial incentives to shape the effort managers devote to making R&D investments productive, while simultaneously biasing investors' expectations of that effort.
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Effect of R&D Capitalization on Managerial Effort and Investor Expectations
We examine whether the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) costs affects how much effort managers devote to R&D and investors' expectations of that effort. In an incentivized laboratory market, we hold R&D costs fixed, while managers choose how to divide their unobservable effort between a routine operating project that generates certain, immediate returns and an uncertain R&D project for which additional effort increases the probability of success. We manipulate whether R&D costs are expensed or capitalized, with capitalized R&D subject to impairment testing, and whether managers are compensated based on investor-assessed market value or realized intrinsic value. We find that capitalization increases managers' R&D effort, but only when their compensation is based on investor-assessed market value, consistent with managers strategically responding to the reporting consequences of their effort choices. Investors, however, expect less managerial R&D effort under capitalization than expensing. This divergence creates systematic estimation errors, with investors overestimating R&D effort under expensing and underestimating it under capitalization. Overall, our findings show that R&D accounting interacts with managerial incentives to shape the effort managers devote to making R&D investments productive, while simultaneously biasing investors' expectations of that effort.
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
Firm Investments in Employee‐Led Entrepreneurial Ventures
Firms increasingly support employee‐led startups by providing funding in exchange for equity. These investments create a dual role for employees, who pursue their entrepreneurial ventures as shared residual claimants while continuing to work on core tasks under incomplete fixed‐pay contracts. Although the investments align incentives within the startup, their effects on employees' effort in their core roles remain unclear. Using an experimental economics approach, I examine how a firm's investment decision affects employees' effort on core tasks. To isolate what is unique about equity investments, I use a non‐equity gift of equal monetary value as the baseline. The results show that employees reduce effort more when the firm denies a non‐equity gift than when it denies an equity investment. This difference arises because employees view a denied equity investment as the firm's business judgment based on risk and expected return, rather than as a failure to act generously. When funding in either form is provided, employees reciprocate positively, resulting in similarly high effort. Overall, the findings suggest that equity‐based entrepreneurship programs can help motivate effort on both startups and core tasks while mitigating the harm of rejecting employees' proposals.
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
Firm Investments in Employee‐Led Entrepreneurial Ventures
Firms increasingly support employee‐led startups by providing funding in exchange for equity. These investments create a dual role for employees, who pursue their entrepreneurial ventures as shared residual claimants while continuing to work on core tasks under incomplete fixed‐pay contracts. Although the investments align incentives within the startup, their effects on employees' effort in their core roles remain unclear. Using an experimental economics approach, I examine how a firm's investment decision affects employees' effort on core tasks. To isolate what is unique about equity investments, I use a non‐equity gift of equal monetary value as the baseline. The results show that employees reduce effort more when the firm denies a non‐equity gift than when it denies an equity investment. This difference arises because employees view a denied equity investment as the firm's business judgment based on risk and expected return, rather than as a failure to act generously. When funding in either form is provided, employees reciprocate positively, resulting in similarly high effort. Overall, the findings suggest that equity‐based entrepreneurship programs can help motivate effort on both startups and core tasks while mitigating the harm of rejecting employees' proposals.
- Open Access
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
When Managers Publicly Oppose Labor Unions: Effects on Worker Productivity and Wage Bargaining
Interest in labor unions has resurged in the United States, yet many workers remain ambivalent about whether unions help or hurt them. At the same time, managerial opposition to unions is widespread, but firms differ sharply in whether they make that opposition public. In an interactive wage-bargaining experiment, we find that publicly disclosing managerial opposition to unions increases effort and realized wages for workers with an anti-union stance, but does not generate similar gains for workers with a pro-union stance. This divergence arises because the same disclosure triggers heterogeneous belief updating. For anti-union workers, who initially doubt the benefits of collective bargaining, disclosed managerial opposition to unions provides new information about relative bargaining power. Specifically, they learn through the disclosure that managers prefer individual bargaining because it allows them to use wage-setting discretion to tie pay closely to individual performance, while collective bargaining may strengthen workers' bargaining position more than previously believed. Pro-union workers, in contrast, learn little new from the disclosure. Instead, it confirms their prior beliefs, leaving effort incentives unchanged. Overall, our study provides causal evidence that the disclosure of managerial opposition to unions itself, apart from any accompanying tactics, can materially shape worker productivity and pay.
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhen Managers Publicly Oppose Labor Unions: Effects on Worker Productivity and Wage Bargaining
Interest in labor unions has resurged in the United States, yet many workers remain ambivalent about whether unions help or hurt them. At the same time, managerial opposition to unions is widespread, but firms differ sharply in whether they make that opposition public. In an interactive wage-bargaining experiment, we find that publicly disclosing managerial opposition to unions increases effort and realized wages for workers with an anti-union stance, but does not generate similar gains for workers with a pro-union stance. This divergence arises because the same disclosure triggers heterogeneous belief updating. For anti-union workers, who initially doubt the benefits of collective bargaining, disclosed managerial opposition to unions provides new information about relative bargaining power. Specifically, they learn through the disclosure that managers prefer individual bargaining because it allows them to use wage-setting discretion to tie pay closely to individual performance, while collective bargaining may strengthen workers' bargaining position more than previously believed. Pro-union workers, in contrast, learn little new from the disclosure. Instead, it confirms their prior beliefs, leaving effort incentives unchanged. Overall, our study provides causal evidence that the disclosure of managerial opposition to unions itself, apart from any accompanying tactics, can materially shape worker productivity and pay.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 302-322
Incentives, Framing, and Reliance on Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental Study
Managerial decision makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies, but they are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision makers’ reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1,500 participants, we find that compared with a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in effort duration and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as also incorporating human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices, such as incentives and task framing, influence the interaction of human decision makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02777 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 302-322
Top Cited PapersIncentives, Framing, and Reliance on Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental Study
Managerial decision makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies, but they are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision makers’ reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1,500 participants, we find that compared with a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in effort duration and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as also incorporating human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices, such as incentives and task framing, influence the interaction of human decision makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02777 .
- 28 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 116
Voluntary managerial pay cuts and employee effort
- 28 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 116
Voluntary managerial pay cuts and employee effort
- Open Access
- 31 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Firm Investments in Employee-led Entrepreneurial Ventures
Firms increasingly support employee-led startups by providing funding in exchange for equity. These investments create a dual role for employees, who pursue their entrepreneurial ventures as shared residual claimants while continuing to work on core tasks under incomplete fixed-pay contracts. Although the investments align incentives within the startup, their effects on employees’ effort in their core roles remain unclear. Using an experimental economics approach, I examine how a firm’s investment decision affects employees’ reciprocal effort on core tasks. To isolate what is unique about equity investments, I use a non-equity gift of equal monetary value as the baseline. The results show that employees respond more negatively when denied a non-equity gift than when denied an equity investment, as they interpret the latter as a risk-return calculation rather than a lack of generosity. When funding is provided, employees reciprocate positively in both cases, resulting in similarly high effort. Overall, the findings suggest that equity-based entrepreneurship programs can help motivate effort on both startups and core tasks while mitigating the harm of rejecting employees’ proposals.
- 31 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFirm Investments in Employee-led Entrepreneurial Ventures
Firms increasingly support employee-led startups by providing funding in exchange for equity. These investments create a dual role for employees, who pursue their entrepreneurial ventures as shared residual claimants while continuing to work on core tasks under incomplete fixed-pay contracts. Although the investments align incentives within the startup, their effects on employees’ effort in their core roles remain unclear. Using an experimental economics approach, I examine how a firm’s investment decision affects employees’ reciprocal effort on core tasks. To isolate what is unique about equity investments, I use a non-equity gift of equal monetary value as the baseline. The results show that employees respond more negatively when denied a non-equity gift than when denied an equity investment, as they interpret the latter as a risk-return calculation rather than a lack of generosity. When funding is provided, employees reciprocate positively in both cases, resulting in similarly high effort. Overall, the findings suggest that equity-based entrepreneurship programs can help motivate effort on both startups and core tasks while mitigating the harm of rejecting employees’ proposals.