Veronica A. Pear
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Veronica A. Pear has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron B. Shev
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Andrew Crawford
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Daniel J. Tancredi
Department of Pediatrics, School of Medicine, UC Davis, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Elizabeth A. Tomsich
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Garen J. Wintemute
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications - Julia P. Schleimer
Department of Emergency Medicine, School of Medicine, UC Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Public Health
- Vol. 26 (1)
In search of common ground: Louisiana’s resistance to an extreme risk protection order law for domestic violence prevention
Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws allow civil courts to authorize orders to temporarily prevent a person from purchasing or possessing firearms upo
- 18 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Public Health
- Vol. 26 (1)
Open AccessIn search of common ground: Louisiana’s resistance to an extreme risk protection order law for domestic violence prevention
Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws allow civil courts to authorize orders to temporarily prevent a person from purchasing or possessing firearms upo
- Open Access
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Views on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Open AccessViews on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- Open Access
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Support for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Open AccessSupport for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- Open Access
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-10
Predicting neighborhood-level violence from features of the physical and social environment with machine learning
Background: Violence is a leading cause of death and disparity in the United States. Individuals’ physical and social environments can prevent or foster violence, but these complex milieus are challenging to model. In this study, we used machine learning to identify features of the local environment that are most predictive of violence in two Midwestern cities struggling with disinvestment and crime. Methods: This was a serial cross-sectional study of census tracts in Cleveland, Ohio and Detroit, Michigan, 2011–2019. We took a machine learning approach—extreme gradient boosting—that enabled us to model 55 neighborhood features simultaneously and without making assumptions about their relationships or functional form. These features included building quality and type, public goods and services, residential stability, socioeconomic features, historical features, and demographic features. Primary outcomes were police-reported counts per square mile of violent crime and violent crime involving a firearm in Cleveland. Secondary outcomes were homicide and firearm homicide in Cleveland and Detroit. Variable importance was assessed with Shapley values. Results: The primary models performed well, with a correlation between observed and predicted counts of 0.89 for violent crime and 0.65 for firearm-involved violent crime. For both outcomes, the variables with the highest importance tended to be in the domains of building quality and type or socioeconomic features. Several variables had high importance for both outcomes, including multifamily homes per square mile, road network density, commercial buildings per square mile, and percentage of the population that was white. Conclusions: These findings underscore the fundamental importance of place in preventing and generating violence. Future studies should explore modifiable, highly important variables as potential points of intervention.
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-10
Open AccessPredicting neighborhood-level violence from features of the physical and social environment with machine learning
Background: Violence is a leading cause of death and disparity in the United States. Individuals’ physical and social environments can prevent or foster violence, but these complex milieus are challenging to model. In this study, we used machine learning to identify features of the local environment that are most predictive of violence in two Midwestern cities struggling with disinvestment and crime. Methods: This was a serial cross-sectional study of census tracts in Cleveland, Ohio and Detroit, Michigan, 2011–2019. We took a machine learning approach—extreme gradient boosting—that enabled us to model 55 neighborhood features simultaneously and without making assumptions about their relationships or functional form. These features included building quality and type, public goods and services, residential stability, socioeconomic features, historical features, and demographic features. Primary outcomes were police-reported counts per square mile of violent crime and violent crime involving a firearm in Cleveland. Secondary outcomes were homicide and firearm homicide in Cleveland and Detroit. Variable importance was assessed with Shapley values. Results: The primary models performed well, with a correlation between observed and predicted counts of 0.89 for violent crime and 0.65 for firearm-involved violent crime. For both outcomes, the variables with the highest importance tended to be in the domains of building quality and type or socioeconomic features. Several variables had high importance for both outcomes, including multifamily homes per square mile, road network density, commercial buildings per square mile, and percentage of the population that was white. Conclusions: These findings underscore the fundamental importance of place in preventing and generating violence. Future studies should explore modifiable, highly important variables as potential points of intervention.