Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
Authors:
- Karine Van der StraetenKSKarine Van der Straeten
- Jean-François LaslierJLJean-François Laslier
- Nicolas SaugerNSNicolas Sauger
- André BlaisABAndré Blais
- 16 March 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 35 (3) , 435-472
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Leader RuleJournal of Theoretical Politics, 2009
- Rational Expectations or Heuristics?Party Politics, 2008
- One-round vs Two-round Elections: An Experimental StudyFrench Politics, 2007
- Incommensurability and Issue VotingJournal of Theoretical Politics, 2007
- Why is there so Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?Political Studies, 2002
- A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty ElectionsBritish Journal of Political Science, 2000
- A Theory of Voting EquilibriaAmerican Political Science Review, 1993
- Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental SettingThe Journal of Politics, 1988
- Dominance Solvable Voting SchemesEconometrica, 1979
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975