States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged
- 18 February 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 365-385
Abstract
Models of decision-making under uncertainty gain much of their power from the specification of states so as to resolve all uncertainty. However, this specification can undermine the presumed observability of preferences on which axiomatic theories of decision-making are based. We introduce the notion of a contingency. Contingencies need not resolve all uncertainty, but preferences over functions from contingencies to outcomes are (at least in principle) observable. In sufficiently simple situations, states and contingencies coincide. In more challenging situations, the analyst must choose between sacrificing observability in order to harness the power of states that resolve all uncertainty, or preserving observability by working with contingencies. JEL Codes: D8.Keywords
This publication has 29 references indexed in Scilit:
- IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO SATISFY SAVAGE'S AXIOMS?Economics and Philosophy, 2009
- Understanding the nonadditive probability decision modelEconomic Theory, 1997
- Case-Based Decision TheoryThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995
- A Rational Reconstruction of the Compromise Effect: Using Market Data to Infer UtilitiesJournal of Consumer Research, 1995
- Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow GivingThe Economic Journal, 1990
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian RationalityEconometrica, 1987
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric InformationJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1983
- The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of ChoiceScience, 1981
- Agreeing to DisagreeThe Annals of Statistics, 1976
- The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure DataInternational Economic Review, 1967