New adventures of oligopolist companies in Russia: On the compatibility of economic theory and law in antitrust
- 9 July 2025
- journal article
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 7,p. 143-159
Abstract
We offer an economic explanation of the position of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court regarding the application of the norm on collective dominance which was formulated in the “Review of judicial practice related to bringing to administrative responsibility for violations of antimonopoly legislation”. Our results are based on a literature review and a brief retrospective analysis of antimonopoly cases concerning collectively dominant companies. This paper provides arguments for the conclusion on the restoration of the principle of complementarity, compatibility of economic theory and law, the theory of oligopoly and the concept of collective dominance. The significance of the approach proposed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to the application of the norm on collective dominance is explained using the concept of meso-institutions. We have uncovered potential challenges and opportunities for various interest groups in the light of expected significant institutional changes which are not related with changes in the relevant norms of the Russian legislation.Keywords
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