LMLeonardo Madio

Leonardo Madio

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Leonardo Madio has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Regulating physicians’ prices in the presence of health platforms

    by Chiara Canta, Leonardo Madio, Andrea Mantovani, Carlo Reggiani

  • Open Access

    Platform Tying and its Effects 

    by Leonardo Madio, Fabio M. Manenti, Massimo Motta

    We study on-platform tying by a dominant platform that controls a primary access point and operates an adjacent specialised service. A rival service can reach users both through the dominant platform and through a direct channel. In a two-sided market where platforms charge sellers and seller participation affects consumer demand, tying improves the integrated service, but also shifts demand away from the rival. We show that lower mediated demand reduces seller participation on the rival platform, weakening the rival also for users who access it directly. As a result, tying can reduce consumer surplus and welfare once the direct channel is sufficiently large. We also compare tying with demotion and with a common-access policy, and show that our main insights carry over to a one-sided model in which network effects operate among consumers who pay directly for the specialised service.

  • Open Access

    Are You 18? Age Verification and Adult-only Consumption in the US 

    by Saharsh Agarwal, Uttara M Ananthakrishnan, Leonardo Madio, Matthew F. Mitchell, Martin Quinn, Carlo Reggiani

    Several U.S. states now require age verification for accessing online pornography. We compile domain-state-week traffic for major adult platforms across fifteen states and estimate the causal impact of age verification laws using a difference-indifferences design with staggered adoption. In treated states, platforms that implemented ageverification gates experienced large declines in observed visit (e.g., xHamster), while large free-access sites that remained ungated during the sample period (e.g., XNXX, XVideos) gained 35-40%, consistent with substantial cross-platform substitution. By contrast, registration-and payment-based platforms (e.g., OnlyFans, Stripchat) exhibit smaller changes, consistent with lower marginal frictions when users are already authenticated. Overall, the evidence suggests that age-verification laws can reallocate observed traffic across major platforms in our sample while reducing visits to adopting and blocked domains.

  • Open Access

    Big Tech Lending and Business Expansion

    by Leonardo Gambacorta, Leonardo Madio, Bruno Maria Parigi

    We study why big tech platforms may enter the lending market and how this affects vendors and welfare. In the absence of platform lending, high transaction fees reduce vendors' effective margins, discouraging bank lending and leaving some creditworthy vendors without funding. When the platform extends credit directly, it internalizes this externality: it can subsidize loans to high-risk/high-gain vendors while adjusting transaction fees for all sellers, thereby stimulating vendor investment and marketplace activity. However, lending also creates new frictions. If investment projects are sufficiently profitable, even low-risk/low-gain vendors may borrow opportunistically, forcing the platform to adopt a second-best strategy by raising loan rates and adjusting fees. If projects are less profitable, high rates naturally screen out opportunistic borrowing but limit the benefits of platform credit. Thus, platform entry into lending introduces a novel trade-off between expanding access to finance and mitigating opportunism, with ambiguous implications for overall welfare

  • Open Access

    Curation with moral hazard: Why platforms host low quality *

    by Özlem Bedre Defolie, Bjørn Olav Johansen, Leonardo Madio

    We identify a novel mechanism under which a revenue-maximizing platform may decide to host some harmful sellers, even when they are identifiable and removable at zero cost. We model monopolistic sellers in independent markets: normal sellers differ in intrinsic quality and can improve quality through costly, unobservable effort. Bad sellers supply either zero-quality or harmful products, and exert no effort. The platform operates a binary certification and chooses how many bad sellers to remove. Hosting some bad sellers thickens the left tail of the quality distribution, lowering the expected quality of uncertified products and thereby raising normal sellers' effort. However, it also lowers average quality and trade value. We show that hosting bad sellers is optimal if they are not too harmful. Relative to a planner, the platform hosts too many bad sellers. Platform liability reduces this distortion, whereas seller liability and compensation schemes for consumers may be ineffective.

    • 10 February 2026
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    "Mergers and Investments in New Products"

    by Anna D'Annunzio, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio

    >This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms' incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider's innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts.

  • Open Access

    Disciplining digital risk: evidence from cyber stress tests

    by Nordine Abidi, Leonardo Gambacorta, Christoffer Kok, Leonardo Madio, Ixart Miquel-Flores, Alberto Partida

    Investment in cybersecurity in an interconnected banking system has public-good proper- ties: positive externalities can generate systemic underinvestment. Using confidential supervi- sory data from the European Central Bank, we first identify “laggard” European banks that underinvest relative to their cyber-risk profiles, and then examine how supervisory scrutiny af- fects their incentives to invest. We exploit the 2024 ECB Cyber Resilience Stress Test (CyRST) as a quasi-natural experiment. In a difference-in-differences design, we find that following the CyRST announcement, laggard banks increased cybersecurity investment by about 80% rel- ative to their peers. The response is stronger among laggards subject to high-intensity su- pervisory oversight, consistent with scrutiny exerting a disciplining effect. Overall, the results suggest that targeted supervisory scrutiny may help mitigate underinvestment incentives and strengthen banks’ operational risk management.

    • 25 June 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and Investments: Where Do We Stand?

    by Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio, François Jeanjean, Bruno Jullien, José Moraga

    In this paper, we review recent studies on the impact of mergers on investments. First, we examine how mergers among competing incumbents influence firms' incentives to develop new products and undertake cost-reducing or quality-enhancing investments. Second, we analyze how an incumbent's acquisition of an innovative entrant affects the investment incentives of both parties. Third, we discuss the effects of vertical mergers on the investment decisions of both upstream and downstream firms. Finally, we outline a few directions for future research.

  • Open Access

    Content moderation and advertising in social media platforms

    by Leonardo Madio, Martin Quinn

    We study the incentive of an ad‐funded social media platform to curb the presence of unsafe content that entails reputational risk to advertisers. We identify conditions for the platform not to moderate unsafe content and demonstrate how the optimal moderation policy depends on the risk the advertisers face. The platform is likely to undermoderate unsafe content relative to the socially desirable level when both advertisers and users have congruent preferences for unsafe content and to overmoderate unsafe content when advertisers have conflicting preferences for unsafe content. Finally, to mitigate negative externalities generated by unsafe content, we study the implications of a policy that mandates binding content moderation to online platforms and how the introduction of taxes on social media activity and social media platform competition can distort the platform's moderation strategies.