Tommaso Pavone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Tommaso Pavone has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen
University of Copenhagen
2 shared publications Antoinette Scherz
Stockholm University
1 shared publication- Antoinette Scherz
Stockholm University
1 shared publication - Cassandra V. Emmons
Harvard University
1 shared publication - Christophe Hillion
University of Oslo
1 shared publication - Christophe Hillion
University of Oslo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Democratic frontsliding in the European Union: the problem of autocratic enclaves and the case for restorative disobedience
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDemocratic frontsliding in the European Union: the problem of autocratic enclaves and the case for restorative disobedience
- Open Access
- 21 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Democratic Frontsliding in the European Union: The Problem of Autocratic Enclaves and the Case for Restorative Disobedience
After somber warnings of a democratic recession, there are glimmers of democratic renewal, including in the European Union. As an illiberal government in Poland was voted out of office, policymakers began debating how to restore liberal democracy and what role the EU should play. We answer by theorizing “democratic frontsliding” – the piecemeal restoration of liberal democratic institutions and practices after a period of democratic erosion – and explain how obstructions to frontsliding can be overcome. Poland illuminates how frontsliding confronts the problem of “autocratic enclaves:” illiberal elites who survive a democratizing election and wield their institutional powers to obstruct democratic restoration. To dismantle autocratic enclaves, we argue that a government may need to adopt transgressive acts of defiance and conscientious rule-breaking, which we call “restorative disobedience.” We develop normative criteria for restorative disobedience to prevent its abuse and explain how the EU can mandate, incentivize, and support restorative disobedience.
- 21 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessDemocratic Frontsliding in the European Union: The Problem of Autocratic Enclaves and the Case for Restorative Disobedience
After somber warnings of a democratic recession, there are glimmers of democratic renewal, including in the European Union. As an illiberal government in Poland was voted out of office, policymakers began debating how to restore liberal democracy and what role the EU should play. We answer by theorizing “democratic frontsliding” – the piecemeal restoration of liberal democratic institutions and practices after a period of democratic erosion – and explain how obstructions to frontsliding can be overcome. Poland illuminates how frontsliding confronts the problem of “autocratic enclaves:” illiberal elites who survive a democratizing election and wield their institutional powers to obstruct democratic restoration. To dismantle autocratic enclaves, we argue that a government may need to adopt transgressive acts of defiance and conscientious rule-breaking, which we call “restorative disobedience.” We develop normative criteria for restorative disobedience to prevent its abuse and explain how the EU can mandate, incentivize, and support restorative disobedience.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e158
Leveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote Its Legitimacy
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can adopt pro-individual rights agendas to promote their own legitimacy. By leveling the odds for disempowered individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs rebut charges that they are playthings of the powerful and cultivate support networks in civil society. We assess our theory by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Established as an economic court and alleged to conceal a pro-business bias, we leverage original data demonstrating that the ECJ publicizes itself as protector of individuals and matches words with deeds. The ECJ ‘levels’, favoring individuals’ rights claims over claims raised by businesses boasting better legal teams. The ECJ then ‘spotlights’ pro-individual rights rulings via press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. These findings challenge claims that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the ‘haves’ come out ahead in litigation.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e158
Open AccessLeveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote Its Legitimacy
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can adopt pro-individual rights agendas to promote their own legitimacy. By leveling the odds for disempowered individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs rebut charges that they are playthings of the powerful and cultivate support networks in civil society. We assess our theory by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Established as an economic court and alleged to conceal a pro-business bias, we leverage original data demonstrating that the ECJ publicizes itself as protector of individuals and matches words with deeds. The ECJ ‘levels’, favoring individuals’ rights claims over claims raised by businesses boasting better legal teams. The ECJ then ‘spotlights’ pro-individual rights rulings via press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. These findings challenge claims that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the ‘haves’ come out ahead in litigation.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Law & Social Inquiry
- Vol. 49 (3) , 1921-1930
Lawyering in Hard Places: Comparative Dispatches from the Margins of Legality
Lawyering in Hard Places: Comparative Dispatches from the Margins of Legality - Volume 49 Issue 3
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Law & Social Inquiry
- Vol. 49 (3) , 1921-1930
Open AccessLawyering in Hard Places: Comparative Dispatches from the Margins of Legality
Lawyering in Hard Places: Comparative Dispatches from the Margins of Legality - Volume 49 Issue 3
- Open Access
- 9 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Leveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote its Legitimacy
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can seize individual rights litigation to promote themselves as protectors of the weak. By leveling the odds for less resourceful individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs can cultivate support networks in civil society. We verify this legitimation strategy by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Often cast as a stealthy pro-business court, we show that ECJ judges instead publicized themselves as individual rights promoters: do they match words with deeds? Leveraging an original dataset, we find that the ECJ “levels,” favoring individuals’ rights claims compared to claims by businesses boasting larger, more experienced legal teams. The ECJ also “spotlights” support for individuals through press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. Our findings challenge the view that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the “haves” come out ahead in litigation.
- 9 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessLeveling and Spotlighting: How the European Court of Justice Favors the Weak to Promote its Legitimacy
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can seize individual rights litigation to promote themselves as protectors of the weak. By leveling the odds for less resourceful individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs can cultivate support networks in civil society. We verify this legitimation strategy by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Often cast as a stealthy pro-business court, we show that ECJ judges instead publicized themselves as individual rights promoters: do they match words with deeds? Leveraging an original dataset, we find that the ECJ “levels,” favoring individuals’ rights claims compared to claims by businesses boasting larger, more experienced legal teams. The ECJ also “spotlights” support for individuals through press releases that lawyers amplify in law journals. Our findings challenge the view that ICs build legitimacy by stealth and the “haves” come out ahead in litigation.
- Open Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Follow the Leader: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the EU’s Rule of Law Revolution
The autocratization of Hungary and Poland prompted a revolution in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) caselaw. The Court imposed novel obligations on member states to safeguard the rule of law (ROL) and expanded the legal bases for the EU to sanction governments. We ask: did the ECJ pioneer this ROL revolution or respond to an entrepreneurial European Commission acting as “guardian of the Treaties?” While supranationalist theories depict the Commission as a proactive agenda-setter, studies of the EU’s ROL crisis argue that the Commission dragged its feet or only recently seized the reins of leadership. Deploying a new theory of judicial innovation and agenda-setting on an original dataset of all ROL cases adjudicated by the ECJ, we demonstrate that the Commission has been an inconsistent and often indifferent agenda-setter. Besides several proactive interventions during the Juncker Commission, the Court’s rulings prompted the Commission to act more than the reverse.
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessFollow the Leader: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the EU’s Rule of Law Revolution
The autocratization of Hungary and Poland prompted a revolution in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) caselaw. The Court imposed novel obligations on member states to safeguard the rule of law (ROL) and expanded the legal bases for the EU to sanction governments. We ask: did the ECJ pioneer this ROL revolution or respond to an entrepreneurial European Commission acting as “guardian of the Treaties?” While supranationalist theories depict the Commission as a proactive agenda-setter, studies of the EU’s ROL crisis argue that the Commission dragged its feet or only recently seized the reins of leadership. Deploying a new theory of judicial innovation and agenda-setting on an original dataset of all ROL cases adjudicated by the ECJ, we demonstrate that the Commission has been an inconsistent and often indifferent agenda-setter. Besides several proactive interventions during the Juncker Commission, the Court’s rulings prompted the Commission to act more than the reverse.
- Open Access
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
The End of History in EU Law and Politics? Challenging Founding Narratives with a New Research Agenda
We reassess two foundational narratives of European legal integration that appeared to corroborate “end of history” claims in post-Cold War international and comparative politics research. The first narrative asserts that EU law was locked-in by a virtuous cycle of cooperative national courts applying international rules and governments increasingly deferring to judges. The second narrative posits that the enlargement of the EU bolstered states’ commitment to the rule of law and the European Commission’s resolve to act as “Guardian of the Treaties.” Drawing on dozens of recent studies and novel data, we demonstrate that judicial and political conflicts continue to destabilize the EU legal order and that the on-the-ground authority of EU law has become more uneven over time. To overcome teleological theories of a more institutionalized and law-abiding EU, we propose a new agenda anchored in the concept of “intercurrence:” the overlapping and often conflictual operation of politically-embedded legal orders.
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessThe End of History in EU Law and Politics? Challenging Founding Narratives with a New Research Agenda
We reassess two foundational narratives of European legal integration that appeared to corroborate “end of history” claims in post-Cold War international and comparative politics research. The first narrative asserts that EU law was locked-in by a virtuous cycle of cooperative national courts applying international rules and governments increasingly deferring to judges. The second narrative posits that the enlargement of the EU bolstered states’ commitment to the rule of law and the European Commission’s resolve to act as “Guardian of the Treaties.” Drawing on dozens of recent studies and novel data, we demonstrate that judicial and political conflicts continue to destabilize the EU legal order and that the on-the-ground authority of EU law has become more uneven over time. To overcome teleological theories of a more institutionalized and law-abiding EU, we propose a new agenda anchored in the concept of “intercurrence:” the overlapping and often conflictual operation of politically-embedded legal orders.
- Open Access
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Agendas, Decisions, and Autonomy: How Government Lawyers Shape Judicial Behavior
Social scientists have long traced how private attorneys influence judicial behavior. By contrast, we lack a comparative agenda probing how government lawyers impact the courts. This paper identifies three ways that government attorneys influence judicial behavior: by shaping judicial agendas, decisions, and autonomy. I attribute each mode of influence to a type of government lawyer public prosecutors, government litigators, and executive branch attorneys and illustrate the mechanisms driving their influence over judges via examples. First, I spotlight how government lawyers in law enforcement roles can wield a “politics of discretion” to shape judges agendas by withholding or prioritizing lawsuits. Next, I highlight how attorneys representing governments in court can engage in a “politics of positionality,” leveraging their role as intermediaries and repeat players to influence judgments. Finally, I chronicle how attorneys in the executive branch can weaponize their legal training to undermine judicial independence what I call “power politics, lawyer-style.”
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessAgendas, Decisions, and Autonomy: How Government Lawyers Shape Judicial Behavior
Social scientists have long traced how private attorneys influence judicial behavior. By contrast, we lack a comparative agenda probing how government lawyers impact the courts. This paper identifies three ways that government attorneys influence judicial behavior: by shaping judicial agendas, decisions, and autonomy. I attribute each mode of influence to a type of government lawyer public prosecutors, government litigators, and executive branch attorneys and illustrate the mechanisms driving their influence over judges via examples. First, I spotlight how government lawyers in law enforcement roles can wield a “politics of discretion” to shape judges agendas by withholding or prioritizing lawsuits. Next, I highlight how attorneys representing governments in court can engage in a “politics of positionality,” leveraging their role as intermediaries and repeat players to influence judgments. Finally, I chronicle how attorneys in the executive branch can weaponize their legal training to undermine judicial independence what I call “power politics, lawyer-style.”
- Open Access
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Making the European Court Work: Nicola Catalano and the Origins of European Legal Integration
Nicola Catalano is seldom included among the pantheon of Europe’s founders. To the extent that he is remembered, it is for stint as one of the first judges at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In this chapter, I challenge this consensus to retrace the agents and struggles underlying the early development of the EU’s judicial order. I argue that Catalano made fundamental contributions to shaping European law, but these contributions occurred before and after his ECJ tenure. Leveraging archival, interview, and secondary evidence to retrace Catalano’s variegated professional life, I demonstrate that the development of the EU’s judicial order rested less on the supranational willpower of ECJ judges and more on the tireless entrepreneurship of “Euro-lawyers” eroding resistances to Europeanization within member states. These findings highlight how processes of institutional change hinge on agents who integrate insider expertise with outside mobilization and balance their ideational commitments with tactical pragmatism.
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessMaking the European Court Work: Nicola Catalano and the Origins of European Legal Integration
Nicola Catalano is seldom included among the pantheon of Europe’s founders. To the extent that he is remembered, it is for stint as one of the first judges at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In this chapter, I challenge this consensus to retrace the agents and struggles underlying the early development of the EU’s judicial order. I argue that Catalano made fundamental contributions to shaping European law, but these contributions occurred before and after his ECJ tenure. Leveraging archival, interview, and secondary evidence to retrace Catalano’s variegated professional life, I demonstrate that the development of the EU’s judicial order rested less on the supranational willpower of ECJ judges and more on the tireless entrepreneurship of “Euro-lawyers” eroding resistances to Europeanization within member states. These findings highlight how processes of institutional change hinge on agents who integrate insider expertise with outside mobilization and balance their ideational commitments with tactical pragmatism.
- Open Access
- 5 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Where Have the Guardians Gone? Law Enforcement and the Politics of Supranational Forbearance in the European Union
Why would a supranational law enforcer suddenly refrain from wielding its powers? We theorize the supranational politics of forbearance– the deliberate under-enforcement of the law– and distinguish them from domestic forbearance. We explain why an exemplary supranational enforcer– the European Commission– became reluctant to launch infringements against European Union member states. While the Commission’s legislative role as “engine of integration” has been controversial, its enforcement role as “guardian of the Treaties” has been viewed as less contentious. Yet after 2004, infringements launched by the Commission plummeted. Triangulating between infringement statistics and elite interviews, we trace how the Commission grew alarmed that aggressive enforcement was jeopardizing intergovernmental support for its policy proposals. By embracing dialogue with governments over robust enforcement, the Commission sacrificed its role as guardian of the Treaties to safeguard its role as engine of integration. Our analysis holds broader implications for the study of forbearance in international organizations.
- 5 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessWhere Have the Guardians Gone? Law Enforcement and the Politics of Supranational Forbearance in the European Union
Why would a supranational law enforcer suddenly refrain from wielding its powers? We theorize the supranational politics of forbearance– the deliberate under-enforcement of the law– and distinguish them from domestic forbearance. We explain why an exemplary supranational enforcer– the European Commission– became reluctant to launch infringements against European Union member states. While the Commission’s legislative role as “engine of integration” has been controversial, its enforcement role as “guardian of the Treaties” has been viewed as less contentious. Yet after 2004, infringements launched by the Commission plummeted. Triangulating between infringement statistics and elite interviews, we trace how the Commission grew alarmed that aggressive enforcement was jeopardizing intergovernmental support for its policy proposals. By embracing dialogue with governments over robust enforcement, the Commission sacrificed its role as guardian of the Treaties to safeguard its role as engine of integration. Our analysis holds broader implications for the study of forbearance in international organizations.